

# SDI POLICY AND STRATEGY OVERVIEW

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24 APRIL 90

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## **THE SDI PROGRAM IS OPERATING UNDER CHANGED CONDITIONS**

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- In 1980s, Prospect Was For A Non-cooperative Transition
- Therefore, SDI Program Designed To Cope With:
  - Unconstrained Soviet Strategic Weapons
  - Unconstrained Soviet Countermeasures Program
- Planned For Phased Defensive Deployments  
(Phase I, II, III, . . . ) Of Increasing Performance
- Lower Priority On Limited, Unauthorized Or Accidental  
Attacks On U.S.
- Ballistic Missile Proliferation Low Level Concern



# LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 1990s

## What Has Changed?

- Soviet Political And Economic Reforms
- Improved Climate For U.S.
  - Soviet Relations
- Declining Soviet Defense Spending
- Soviet Conventional Force Reductions / Possible CFE Agreement
- Prospects For START

## What Has Not Changed?

- Soviet Strategic Modernization
  - New SS-18 Mod 5s
  - New Mobile SS-24s And SS-25s
  - New Typhoon And Delta IV SSBNs
  - Bear H And Blackjack
  - Strategic Air And Ballistic Missile Defenses
- Further Spread Of Ballistic Missile Capabilities



## **STRATEGIC DEFENSES PROVIDE MECHANISM FOR EVOLVING U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ONTO MORE STABLE BASIS**

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- **Strategic Defenses Complement / Underpin START Reductions**
  - **Insurance Against Cheating**
  - **Effective Means For Addressing Increasingly Mobile Soviet Threat**
  - **Increased Survivability Of U.S. Forces**
  - **Foundation For Further Offensive Reductions, Incentive For De-MIRVing**



## **STRATEGIC DEFENSES PROVIDE MECHANISM FOR EVOLVING U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ONTO MORE STABLE BASIS (Cont'd)**

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**"Even After INF And Expected Start Treaty Reductions, The Soviets Will Likely Be Able To Satisfy Their Critical Nuclear Targeting Requirements As With Their Current Arsenal Due To Ongoing Force Modernization."**

**H.E. Soyster, LT GEN, USA**

**Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,**

**23 January, 1990**

- **START May Exacerbate Target Base Asymmetries**
- **However, Deterrence Does Not Require Comprehensive Destruction Of Soviet Target Base So Long As Soviets Realize They Cannot Achieve Attack Objectives**
- **Combination Of Offense And Defense Results In Deterrence By Denying Objectives (Damage Limitation)**
- **Damage Limitation More Compatible With Evolving U.S. - Soviet Relationship**



## **EVOLUTION IN THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE MUST BE DEVELOPED IN CONTEXT OF EMERGING THIRD PARTY THREATS**

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- **Direct Threats To**
  - **U.S. Forces Deployed Overseas**
  - **Friends And Allies**
  - **U.S. Power Projection Forces**
- **Escalation Of Regional Conflicts**
- **Potential Future Threats Against U.S. Homeland**


**Emerging Threats Will Require Active Defense**





# U.S. ALLIES & FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES ARE WITHIN RANGE OF EMERGING THREATS

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# THIRD WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

<i>Afghanistan</i> Scud B	300 km	In Service	<i>Israel</i> Jericho I Jericho II	500 km 1500 km	In Service In Service
<i>Argentina</i> Condor II	1000 km	In Dev't	<i>N. Korea</i> Scud B	300 km	In Dev't/ Production
<i>Brazil</i> SS-300 SS-1000	300 km 1200 km	In Dev't In Dev't	<i>Pakistan</i> Hatt I Hatt II	80 km 300 km	Testing Testing
<i>Egypt</i> Scud B	300 km	In Dev't/ Production	<i>Saudi Arabia</i> CSS-2	2700 km	In Service
<i>India</i> Prithvi Agni	150 km 2500 km	Testing Testing	<i>South Africa</i> Jericho II ?	1500 km	Testing
<i>Iran</i> Scud B Shahin 2	300 km 130 km	In Service In Service	<i>South Korea</i> Nike Hercules	300 km	In Service
<i>Iraq</i> Scud B Al-Hussein Al-Abbas Tammuz 1	300 km 650 km 900 km 2000 km	In Service In Service In Service Testing	<i>Syria</i> Scud B SS-21	300 km 110 km	In Service In Service
			<i>South Yemen</i> Scud B	300 km	In Service



# ARCHITECTURE IMPLICATIONS

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- Given START Reductions, The U.S. Could Deploy Layered Defenses That Are More Modest And Less Costly Than The Current Phase I Architecture
  - > 15,000 Warheads Versus 4900 Under START
- Responsive Threat No Longer Unconstrained
  - Funding Limitations, Fewer Missiles / Less Throwweight
- Given Worsening Ballistic Missile Proliferation Problem, More Serious Effort To Develop A Theater Defense System Required



## **CHANGING WORLD PROVIDES CONTEXT FOR EVOLUTION IN U.S. - SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP**

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- Increasing Attention In Soviet Media To Defenses
  - Proliferation Directly Affects USSR
  - Defense Against Limited Threats Feasible
  - Defensive Transition May Be Inevitable, More Stabilizing
  - Strategic Defenses More Consistent With "Defensive Doctrine"

**Therefore,**

**Some Indications That Soviets May Be Willing To  
Discuss Some Form Of Defensive Transition**



## SOVIET INTEREST IN DEFENSES

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**"Domination Of The Offensive Over The Defensive Will Give Way To Defense Domination. The Model Of Defense Domination Will Make It Possible To Switch Over, In Deed, And Not In Word, To A Defensive Military Doctrine At All Levels Of Confrontation... It Is Time We Became Realistic And Gave Up The Hope That SDI Related Work Will Be Discontinued. It Appears That If The Trend Towards The Development Of Defense Technologies Is Correctly Oriented, It May, Far From Leading To Destabilization, Result In A Better Model Of Strategic Stability Than The One We Have"**

*Mikhail Alexandrov*  
*Soviet Military Review*



## CONCLUSION

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- Strategic Defenses Can Make Unique Contributions To U.S. National Security Interests In The 1990s
- The Introduction Of Strategic Defenses Provides A More Stable And Secure Basis For Deterrence
- A Balanced Offense / Defense Posture Would Be More Compatible With The Evolving U.S. - Soviet Relationship
- Robustly Funded Research And Development Program Necessary To Support A Deployment Responsive To Guidance